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JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a judgment from the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Homer K. Wilkinson, presiding, in favor of Defendant 
Garry Spire dba Hokeiko Broadcasting Company ("Hokeiko") and against Plaintiff Channel 
Twenty Television Company, L.L.C. and the Reverend Isaac Max Jaramillo (collectively 
"CTTC"). The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0), 
and pursuant to the Supreme Court's Order of Referral herein, dated March 7, 2000. 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
The trial court granted Hokeiko's motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56(c), 
Utah R. Civ. P., and denied CTTC's cross motion for summary judgment. The issues arising 
from that ruling are: 
1. Whether the trial court erred in ruling that, as a matter of law, Defendant Hokeiko 
had the right to terminate the Settlement Agreement as of October 8, 1987, despite the fact that 
two days earlier, the FCC had issued a Letter Ruling approving the Settlement Agreement? 
(Preserved at R.653-658). 
2. Whether the trial court erred by failing to address, and therefore dismissing, as a 
matter of law, CTTC's claims against Defendant Hokeiko, based upon alleged breaches of the 
Settlement Agreement, while the Settlement Agreement remained in effect. (Preserved at R.644-
650). 
3. Whether the trial court erred by failing to address, and therefore ruling that, as a 
matter of law, CTTC had no right to waive the condition precedent of finality prior to the 
effective date of Hokeiko's purported termination of the Agreement? (Preserved at R.650-653). 
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4. Whether the trial court erred by failing to address, and therefore ruling that, as a 
matter of law, defendant Hokeiko was not estopped from terminating the Settlement Agreement, 
by his prior conduct? (Preserved at R.658-659). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The trial court's ruling arose in consideration of cross motions for summary judgment, 
pursuant to Rule 56(c), Utah R. Civ. P. where the issue was: 
[Whether] the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions of file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. 
Each of the questions presented for review are questions of law. Therefore, the trial court's legal 
determinations are given no deference, but are reviewed for correctness. Ong International 
(U.S.A.) Inc. v. 11th Avenue Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 452 (Utah 1993). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
CTTC and Hokeiko were competing applicants before the FCC for a permit to construct a 
broadcast station to operate on Channel 20 in the Salt Lake City market. (R. 1). On December 14, 
1995, the parties reached a "Settlement Agreement" whereby Hokeiko agreed to withdraw its 
application, and take no action to frustrate or impede CTTC's efforts to obtain FCC approval of 
its application. In consideration, CTTC agreed to pay Hokeiko the settlement amount of 
$65,000. (R.l) (A copy of the Settlement Agreement is attached hereto as Addendum A). The 
payment of the settlement amount, however, was expressly conditioned upon, among other 
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things, CTTC receiving final FCC approval of its broadcast application. In accordance with FCC 
procedures, on December 14, 1995, the parties presented jointly an application for approval of 
the Settlement Agreement. (R.3). 
In August 1997, while the application for approval of the Settlement Agreement remained 
pending, Hokeiko through its FCC counsel contacted a staff member of the FCC, and informed 
the FCC staff member that Hokeiko was considering withdrawing from the Settlement 
Agreement. (R.509). CTCC suspects that there was more to the contact, but by the time the 
motion for summary judgment cameon for hearing, Hokeiko had yet to comply with an express 
court order requiring that it produce billing records from its FCC counsel. (R.825-838). 
On October 8, 1997, Hokeiko served CTTC notice of its intent to terminate the 
Settlement Agreement. (R.510). By the notice, Hokeiko expressly acknowledged that under the 
terms of the Settlement Agreement the termination would be not be effective until October 18, 
1997. (R.517). Concerned of the possibility of the FCC approving the Settlement Agreement in 
the interim, Hokeiko immediately filed with the FCC, a notice advising the FCC that (effective in 
10 days) it was withdrawing from the Settlement Agreement, and reinstating its application. 
(R.511) (A copy of the Withdrawal Notice is attached hereto as Addendum B). 
Unbeknownst to Hokeiko, the FCC had acted two days earlier - granting CTTC's 
application on October 6, 1997, dismissing Hokeiko's application and approving the Settlement 
Agreement. ("Letter Ruling"). (R.524-526). (A copy of the Letter Ruling is attached hereto as 
Addendum C). On October 15, 1997, notwithstanding Hokeiko's belated Withdrawal Notice on 
October 8, 1997, the FCC served public notice of its Letter Ruling approving CTTC's 
application. (R.513). Accordingly, in the absence of any appeal or petition for reconsideration, 
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the order approving CTTC's permit would have automatically become a final, nonreviewable 
order on November 25, 1997. (R.675). The finality of the approval was the last remaining 
condition precedent to CTTC's payment of the $65,000 settlement amount. 
By letter dated October 17, 1997, CTTC advised Hokeiko that it would waive the 
condition precedent of the finality of the FCC order, and tendered payment of the $65,000 
settlement amount. (R.474, 527). (A copy of the "Tender Letter" is attached hereto as 
Addendum D"). Hokeiko rejected the tender. (R.3). Consequently, CTTC immediately filed 
this action against Hokeiko, and sought a court order enjoining Hokeiko from taking further 
action before the FCC to prevent the Letter Ruling from becoming a final order. (R.1-56, 79-80). 
The trial court denied CTTC's motion for a restraining order. (R. 195). Hokeiko filed a petition 
before the FCC seeking a reconsideration of the Letter Ruling. (R.532-547). (A copy of the 
petition is attached hereto as Addendum E). At the time of the trial court's ruling, Hokeiko's 
petition for reconsideration was still pending before the FCC. 
As a result of Hokeiko's petition for reconsideration, CTTC amended its complaint to 
seek alternatively, an order of specific performance enforcing the Settlement Agreement, or a 
award of damages arising from the breach by Hokeiko of the Settlement Agreement. (R.145-
157). CTTC also filed suit against Lawrence Rogow dba Front Range Broadcasting Company 
and Utah Television L.L.C. on related issues. 
On June 2, 1999, Defendant Hokeiko moved for summary judgment. (R.467-468). The 
principal basis for the motion was that by this lawsuit, CTTC was seeking to enforce the 
Settlement Agreement, and that pursuant to ^ 13 of the Settlement Agreement, Hokeiko had the 
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right to terminate the Settlement Agreement.1 (R.637-662). On June 25, 1999, Plaintiff CTTC 
filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. (R.634-636). CTTC argued that by its interpretation 
of the Settlement Agreement, once the FCC approved the Settlement Agreement on October 6, 
1997, Hokeiko had no right to terminate the agreement. CTTC further argued that even if 
Hokeiko had the right to terminate the Settlement Agreement, CTTC was entitled to pursue its 
claim for damages arising from Hokeiko's willful breach of the Settlement Agreement which 
occurred prior to the effective date of termination, October 18, 1997. CTTC further argued that 
Hokeiko was estopped from terminating the Settlement Agreement because it had acted to delay 
approval by the FCC of the Settlement Agreement. 
At the hearing on summary judgment, the trial court adopted an interpretation of f 13 of 
the Settlement Agreement that Hokeiko presented at oral arguments but had not briefed. The 
trial court concluded that the "most" reasonable interpretation of f 13 required both initial and 
final approval within 12 months. (R.l 170). With a cryptic explanation on record, the trial court 
also concluded that as a result of its interpretation of the Settlement Agreement, there was no 
further need to resolve the collateral issues raised by CTTC. (A copy of the transcript of the trial 
court's oral ruling is attached hereto as Addendum F). Hence, the trial court granted summary 
judgment in favor of Defendant Hokeiko, and by implication denied CTTC's cross motion for 
summary j udgment. 
By granting summary judgment for Hokeiko, the trial court denied CTTC the opportunity 
to show that but for Hokeiko's earlier efforts to delay FCC consideration of CTTC's application, 
1
 Hokeiko also argued that CTTC was not the proper plaintiff in this action because it alleged 
that the FCC had not formally approved assignment of interest to CTTC from Jaramillo. Rather 
than address the issue, the parties agreed that the complaint could be amended to include 
Jaramillo as a co-plaintiff. (R.958-959). 
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the Settlement Agreement could have been approved back in August 1997, with finality 
occurring prior to Hokeiko's decision to terminate the Agreement on October 8, 1997. 
Subsequently, on December 20, 1999, the trial court granted Defendant Lawrence 
Rogow's motion for summary judgment, thereby disposing of all claims against all parties, with 
the entry of Judgment entered on January 3, 2000. (R. 1152). By the appeal, CTTC is disputing 
the grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant Spire, but is not seeking to set aside the 
grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant Rogow. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
By this action, CTTC sought to enforce a Settlement Agreement between the parties. 
Hokeiko's motion for summary judgment was premised on the simple contention that, under its 
interpretation of the language of the Settlement Agreement, notwithstanding FCC approval of the 
Settlement Agreement on October 6, 1997, it had the right to terminate the Agreement, and thus 
CTTC's action must fail. In response, CTTC disputed the interpretation of the Agreement 
presented by Hokeiko. Under CTTC's interpretation, upon approval, Hokeiko could not 
terminate the Agreement, unless and until the approval failed to became a final order. 
Additionally, CTTC noted that even if Hokeiko interpretation were accepted by the court, there 
were three independent reasons why summary judgment would be inappropriate. 
At the hearing, the trial court adopted an interpretation of If 13 offered by Hokeiko at the 
hearing, but not raised in its brief. Moreover, the court found it either helpful or necessary to 
rewrite the parties agreement. By rewriting the agreement, the trial court interpreted f 13 of the 
Agreement, as providing the parties the right to terminate the Agreement if "final approval" of 
the agreement does not occur within 12 months of the execution of the Agreement. The trial 
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court did not conclude that the interpretation offered by CTTC was unreasonable, but rather that 
the interpretation the trial court adopted was the most reasonable. When asked to addressed the 
collateral issued raised by CTTC, without a clear explanation, the court stated that its 
interpretation of the agreement obviated the need to resolve the other issues. 
By accepting Hokeiko's interpreting of the Settlement Agreement, the trial court erred in 
two respects. First, the trial court failed to consider whether the interpretation offered by CTTC 
was reasonable. It is not the trial court's role on summary judgment to determine which 
interpretation is the most reasonable, but rather to ascertain whether the Settlement Agreement 
gave rise to only one reasonable interpretation, as a matter of law. 
Second, the trial court erred because the interpretation the court accepted was patently 
unreasonable in that it contradicted the actual language in the Settlement Agreement and could 
lead to absurd results. 
As discussed below, the trial court failed to consider the consequences of Hokeiko's prior 
breach of the Settlement Agreement. When Hokeiko served notice of the termination of the 
Settlement Agreement, Hokeiko acknowledged that the Agreement would remain in effect 
through October 18, 1997. Prior to that date, Hokeiko had undertaken substantial activity before 
the FCC to undermine the grant of CTTC's construction permit, in clear breach of the Settlement 
Agreement. Under common law, the termination of a contract does not excuse a party for 
liability arising from prior breaches. 
As discussed below, the trial court erred by failing to consider whether CTTC had the 
right to waive the remaining condition precedents and tender payment of the settlement amount. 
The evidence presented to the trial court conclusively demonstrated that before the Settlement 
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Agreement was effectively terminated, CTTC offered to pay the full settlement amount and 
waive the remaining condition precedents. Since the condition precedents were imposed for the 
benefit of CTTC, under common law, CTTC had the right to waive the condition precedents, 
tender payment and enforce the Settlement Agreement. 
Finally, by granting Hokeiko summary judgment, the court denied CTTC the opportunity 
to present at trial, evidence showing that Hokeiko caused the delay in the FCC's actions, which 
delay purportedly served was the basis for Hokeiko invoking its termination rights. Hokeiko 
would not be entitled to rely upon the failure of a condition precedent, when Hokeiko's actions 
were the reason for the failure of the condition precedent. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING, AS A MATTER OF LAW, THAT 
HOKEIKO HAD THE RIGHT TO TERMINATE THE SETTLEMENT 
AGREEMENT ON OCTOBER 8,1997. 
The present dispute between the parties arises from the simple fact that for reasons never 
disclosed on the record, on October 8, 1997 Hokeiko sought to terminate the Settlement 
Agreement entered into between the parties. Two days earlier, however, on October 6, 1997, the 
FCC had issued a Letter Ruling approving the Settlement Agreement, granting CTTC's 
application for a construction permit, and dismissing Hokeiko's competing application. When 
Hokeiko served notice of its intent to terminate on October 8, 1997, presumably it was not aware 
that the FCC had already approved the Settlement Agreement. 
The threshold question raised by this appeal, is whether, in light of the Letter Ruling, 
Hokeiko had the right to terminate the Settlement Agreement on October 8, 1997. The relevant 
provision of the Settlement Agreement which defines the rights of the parties to terminate the 
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Agreement is f 13, is stated in full as follows: 
13. If the Commission or its delegate for any reason fails to approve this 
Settlement Agreement, to grant the CTTC application, and to dismiss the 
competing applications within twelve months after the submission of the Joint 
Petition requesting such approval; or, if approved, such actions do not become 
Final Orders, then either Party may terminate this Settlement Agreement upon ten 
days' written notice to the other, following which Hokeiko shall be entitled to 
resume prosecution of its application. 
In order to justify its belated termination notice, Hokeiko raised a myriad of arguments 
below. Hokeiko argued that the Letter Ruling really issued after October 8, and must have been 
backdated by the FCC staff to reflect an October 6 issue date. (R.473). Hokeiko argued that 
Letter Ruling was not effective until October 15, 1997, when public notice of the Letter Ruling 
issued. (R.478). Hokeiko argued that the entire agreement, including all covenants and 
conditions therein was completely illusory. (R.479). Hokeiko argued that because the 
Agreement was not approved within 12 months, the parties could terminate the Settlement 
Agreement at any time, even after receiving such approval. (R.475) Finally, Hokeiko argued 
that f 13 allows the parties to terminate the Settlement Agreement since (because of its action), 
as of the hearing date the Letter Ruling had not become a final order. (R.478). 
In response, CTTC disputed the contention that the Letter Ruling issued at any time after 
October 6, and presented the actual construction permit dated October 6, 1997. (R.674). CTTC 
further argued that, as a result of the Letter Ruling neither party could terminate the Settlement 
Agreement, unless and until the approval failed to become final order. 
In granting Hokeiko summary judgment, the court focused exclusively on the language of 
f 13, and adopted an interpretation that was not raised by Hokeiko in its briefing. The court 
interpreted Tj 13, as requiring that the Settlement Agreement not only be approved within 12 
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months, but such approval must become a final order within the same 12-month time period. 
Since finality did not occur within 12 months, the court concluded that the Settlement Agreement 
was properly terminated. 
This appeal raises two legal issues concerning the trial court's interpretation of Tf 13. The 
first question is whether CTTC presented a reasonable interpretation of the Settlement 
Agreement. If so, then the trial court should have concluded that Tj 13 was ambiguous and denied 
Hokeiko's motion for summary judgment to afford CTTC the opportunity to present evidence at 
trial to establish the parties intent. Second, this Court must consider whether the interpretation of 
the Settlement Agreement accepted by the trial court could reasonably construed from the 
contract. Since the construction adopted by the trial court requires that the trial court either 
rewrite, or write-out relevant provisions of the agreement, and would lead to an absurd result, 
the construction offered by CTTC was the only reasonable construction presented. The trial 
court should have granted CTTC summary judgment holding that, as a matter of law, Hokeiko 
had no right to terminate the Settlement Agreement. 
A. CTTC Offered a Reasonable Construction of the Settlement Agreement. 
Assuming for the moment that the interpretation of Tf 13 offered by Hokeiko, and 
adopted by the trial court, was reasonable, the threshold question this court must address is 
whether CTTC also offered a reasonable construction of the Tf 13 of the Settlement Agreement. 
If so, then the termination provision would be ambiguous, or uncertain, and summary judgment 
was inappropriate. Winegar v Froerer Corp., 813 P 2d 104 (Utah 1991). In Winegar, the Utah 
Supreme Court expressly noted that: 
We may uphold the trial court's ruling only if we agree that the contract was 
unambiguous. As this court observed in Big Butte Ranch, Inc. v. Holm, 570 P.2d 
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690, 691 (Utah 1977), we first examine the language of the instrument, according 
to it the weight and effect it shows the parties intended. If the meaning is 
ambiguous or uncertain, parol evidence of the parties' intentions should be 
admitted. A motion for summary judgment may not be granted if a legal 
conclusion is reached that an ambiguity exists and there is a factual issue as to 
what the parties intended. 
Id at 108 (citing Faulkner, 665 P.2d at 1293.) 
In this case, it is evident that the trial court exceeded the scope of its authority on 
summary judgment. The trial court made no effort to determine whether CTTC's interpretation 
of the Settlement Agreement was reasonable, but merely found that Hokeiko's interpretation to 
be "the most reasonable to be placed upon this." (R. 1170). 
In interpreting a contract, the intention of the parties is controlling. John Call En'g, Inc. 
v.Manti City Corp., 743 P.2d 1205, 1207 (Utah 1987). CTTC reading of t 13, is quite simple, 
and does not contradict any language or principle underlying the Settlement Agreement. CTTC 
contends that it was the parties intent that once the FCC approved the Settlement Agreement on 
October 6, 1997, then neither party could terminate the Settlement Agreement unless and until 
the FCC approval, for whatever reason, was set aside. CTTC's interpretation of 113 gives 
weight and effect to the express clause in the Settlement Agreement: "...; or, if approved, such 
actions do not become Final Orders. . . . " (Addendum A, emphasis added). In determining 
whether CTTC's interpretation is consistent with the parties' intent, the Court should also 
consider the following five points: 
1. The Letter Ruling Approving the Settlement Agreement Materially Alters 
the Rights of the Parties. 
CTTC's interpretation of f 13 is the only interpretation that gives weight 
and effect to the fact that the rights of the parties were significantly and materially altered upon 
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issuance of the Letter Ruling. By its interpretation, the trial court treated both the initial grant 
and the final approval on equal footing - both were required to be approved in 12 months. 
Perhaps the best illustration of the significance of the Letter Ruling can be inferred by the 
desperate efforts by Hokeiko counsel to notify the FCC of Hokeiko's intent to withdraw from the 
Settlement Agreement, prior to the issuance of the Letter Ruling. In his affidavit, Mr. Gastfreund 
describes the considerable pains he took to put the FCC on notice of Hokeiko's intent to 
withdraw: 
10. In addition to assure that the staff of the Television Branch of the 
Video Services Division of the FCC's Mass Media Bureau had a copy of 
Hokeiko's Notice of Withdrawal, I caused a copy of that notice to be sent by 
facsimile on October 8, 1997, to: (1) Clay C. Pendarvis, Esq., Chief, Television 
Branch of the Video Services Division, Mass Media Bureau; (2) Mary M. 
Fitzgerald, Esq., Supervisory Attorney, Television Branch, FCC Mass Media 
Bureau; (3) Selina Ayers of the staff of the Television Branch of the Video 
Services Division of the Mass Media Bureau. I also telephoned Ms. Fitzgerald to 
ensure receipt of my transmittal. 
(Aff. of Gastfreund, f 10)(R.511). 
Accordingly, since the issuance of the Letter Ruling is a material event contemplated by 
the parties, it is reasonable to infer that the parties in drafting f 13 would intend to separate and 
distinguish the rights of the parties, before and after the issuance of the Letter Ruling - hence, 
CTTC's interpretation of the two key words "if approved." gives the proper weight and effect. 
2. The Process of Finality is Generally Perfunctory. 
The only possible challenge to the reasonableness of CTTC's interpretation, 
is the fact that there was no time limit imposed on when the Letter Ruling must become a final 
order. CTTC's interpretation, however, recognizes that once an FCC letter ruling issues, the 
process by which the ruling becomes a final nonappealable ruling, is generally, a perfunctory 
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matter. As Hokeiko noted earlier in this proceeding, "The [fjailure to file the petition [for 
reconsideration] within 30 days ends the right to challenge the action before the F.C.C. 
(Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, 
p. 8) (citing 47 U.S.C.A. § 405(a)). (R.91). By CTTC's calculation, had Hokeiko not filed his 
petition for reconsideration, the FCC Letter Ruling granting CTTC's construction permit and 
approving the Settlement Agreement would have become a final order on or about November 25, 
1997. See47U.S.C. §§ 402, 405; 47 C.F.R., §§ 1.4, 1.106, 1.115, 1.117. ( Wood Aff, ^ 15.) 
(R.675). Thus, it is reasonable to infer that, when drafting the Settlement Agreement, the parties 
would have concern over the time period in which the initial approval occurs, but would not be 
as concerned regarding the timing of finality. 
3. The Settlement Agreement Was Not Self-Terminating. 
CTTC's interpretation gives weight and effect to the fact that the 
Settlement Agreement was not self-terminating. Under CTTC's interpretation, both parties had 
the right to terminate at any time between December 15, 1996 (one year after the Settlement 
Agreement was entered) and October 6, 1997, the date the FCC approved the Agreement by 
issuance of the Letter Ruling. By the express terms of the Agreement, after 12 months the parties 
could choose to either (1) terminate the joint settlement (on 10 days' notice), or (2) exercise 
patience and allow the FCC approval process to continue. By contrast, pursuant to the 
interpretation adopted by the trial court, there is no consequence to the parties allowing the 
approval process to continue without objection. Either party could, despite sitting idle, 
retroactively terminate the Settlement Agreement. 
In this case, both Hokeiko and CTTC, at least until October 8, 1997, chose to remain 
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patient, allowing the motion to approve the Settlement Agreement to remain under consideration 
by the FCC. Thus, under CTTC's interpretation, ^ 13 addresses a legitimate concern, delays in 
the approval process, by providing the parties the option to terminate the Agreement on 10 days' 
notice, but at the same time recognizes that by inaction, the parties can elect to allow the 
approval process to continue. 
4. .. The Settlement Agreement Expressly Imposes a 10-Day Waiting Period. 
CTTC's interpretation is the only interpretation that gives weight and effect 
to the fact that the Settlement Agreement imposes a 10-day waiting period following service of 
notice of intent to withdraw. Under CTTC's interpretation either party would be afforded the 
opportunity within those 10 days to pressure the FCC to act upon the pending motion to approve 
the Settlement Agreement, thereby making moot the notice of intent to withdraw. By contrast, 
under the interpretation, the 10-day waiting period is not tool, but a trap. If determination can, in 
substance, relate back to an inaction by the FCC 10 months ago, what point is served by allowing 
the FCC 10 more days to consider the approval of the Settlement Agreement? 
5. Upon Entry of the Letter Ruling, Hokeiko No Longer Had a Competing 
Application Before the FCC. 
CTTC's interpretation recognizes that the issuance of the Letter Ruling 
effectuates a dismissal of Hokeiko's competing application, and therefore is the only 
interpretation that gives weight and effect to the provision in Tf 13 which provides that after the 
effective date of termination, Hokeiko shall be entitled to resume prosecution of its competing 
application. It is reasonable to infer from this language that it was the intent of the parties, that 
upon termination Hokeiko would have an application pending before the FCC. That would, of 
course, occur either before the Letter Ruling issued, or after the Letter Ruling was set aside. 
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The distinction is significant since the termination rights under ^ 13 belong to both 
parties. For reasons not disclosed on the record, Hokeiko decided that it would rather appeal the 
dismissal of its application, than accept the $65,000 settlement amount offered by CTTC. 
However, assuming that Hokeiko had decided that it would rather consummate the Settlement 
Agreement, under Hokeiko's interpretation of the Settlement Agreement, CTTC would wait until 
the Letter Ruling was approved (and even after it became a final order) and then serve notice of 
its intent to terminate the Settlement Agreement. In that situation, CTTC would receive the 
benefit of the Letter Ruling, and avoid having to pay Hokeiko the settlement amount. Such an 
interpretation would leave Hokeiko not only without the settlement amount, but without a 
competing application. That unfair result is clearly not what the parties intended and is not 
possible under CTTC's interpretation. 
B. The Interpretation Proposed by Hokeiko at the Hearing and Adopted by the Court 
is Unreasonable as a Matter of Law. 
Further, the trial court erred by not granting CTTC summary judgment based upon 
its interpretation of the Settlement Agreement. It is fundamental in contract law that an 
agreement is to be construed to give meaning to all of its terms, and that a construction which 
renders any contract provision meaningless is to be avoided. See Oregon Bank v. Nautilus Crane 
& Equipment Corp., 68 Or. App. 131, 683 P.2d 95 (Or. App. 1984): Public Utility District No. 1 
of Lewis County v. Washington Public Power Supply System, 75 P.2d 1195 (Wash. 1985); 
Wyoming Game and Fish Comm. v. Mills Co., 701 P.2d 819 (Wyo. 1985). 
The trial court, in adopting Hokeiko's proposed interpretation, ruled that the 12-month 
time period applied to both the time in which the initial approval must occur, and the date on 
which the approval must become final. This interpretation, however, is patently unreasonable. 
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The Settlement Agreement provides two alternative conditions allowing for termination, 
which are set forth in separate clauses, separated by a semicolon. The twelve month language is 
found only within the clause the requires initial FCC approval, and which approval occurred on 
October 6, 1997. Significantly, in order for the trial court to adopt Hokeiko's interpretation, it 
found it necessary to rewrite the agreement to move the 12 months on both sides of the 
semicolon: 
I asked counsel for the defendants where does the 12 months apply, to the 
approval or to the becoming final orders? He says becoming final orders. Of 
course, I reread that and rewrote it and, number two, if approved, such actions do 
not become final orders within 12 months after submission, then (B) either party 
may terminate this settlement agreement. 
(emphasis added) (R.l 170). In short, the trial court appears to have rewritten the agreement 
between the parties in order to accommodate Hokeiko's interpretation of the Settlement 
Agreement. The trial court clearly exceeded the scope of its authority on summary judgment. 
Moreover, it is patently absurd to suggest that the parties to would intend to impose the 
same 12-month deadline on both initial and final approval. As noted above, the process by 
which the Letter Ruling becomes a final order is perfunctory, but must nonetheless run its course. 
While the Letter Ruling was issued on October 6, 1997, had Hokeiko not filed its petition for 
reconsideration it would have become a final, nonappealable order on November 25, 1997. 
(R.675). If the parties were genuinely concerned that the finality occur withinl2 months, why 
then allow for the initial approval to also occur within twelve months? After 10 Vi months, 
finality within 12 months becomes impossible. The answer, of course is that the parties had no 
such intent. By separating the two conditions with a semicolon, and imposing the 12-month 
limitation period within the first clause of the initial grant, the parties clearly did not intend to 
impose the same 12-month period on both conditions. The only possible way for the court to 
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reach the conclusion that the parties intended that final approval occur within twelve months was 
to rewrite the Settlement Agreement. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO CONSIDER WHETHER THE 
TERMINATION OF THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT EXCUSED HOKEIKO 
FROM ITS PRIOR WILLFUL BREACH. 
Even assuming arguendo, that the trial court properly concluded that Hokeiko had the 
right to terminate the Settlement Agreement, effective October 18, 1997, it was erroneous for the 
trial court to grant summary judgment without giving due consideration of all collateral issues 
raised by CTTC. In its response to summary judgment, CTTC noted that there were three 
additional issues the court must address before it could rule adverse to CTTC on summary 
judgment. The court made no attempt to resolve the additional issues, but erroneously assumed 
that as a result of its interpretation of f 13, it had resolved all relevant issues necessary to grant 
summary judgment in favor of Hokeiko. 
The first issue the trial court neglected to address, was whether CTTC had the right to 
pursue a claim against Hokeiko for damages arising out of Hokeiko's wilful breaches of the 
Settlement Agreement prior to the effective date of the purported termination of the Agreement. 
A. Termination Did Not Absolve Hokeiko from Liability Arising from Prior 
Breaches. 
As a general rule, CTTC has a right to pursue a claim against Hokeiko for 
damages arising out of or relating to Hokeiko's breach of the agreement, notwithstanding 
subsequent termination of the Settlement Agreement. As stated in Corbin on Contracts: 
The exercise of reserved power of termination will usually have prospective 
operation only; it will discharge both parties from their contractual duty to 
perform promises that are still wholly executory, but will not discharge the duty to 
make reparation for breaches that have already occurred. 
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6 Corbin on Contracts § 1266 (1964 and 1999 Supp.). See also 166 A.L.R. 392 and cases cited 
therein. 
By way of example, applying the principle, the court refused to excuse defendant from 
liability for a breach of contract in the case of Stem and Company, Inc. v. International Harvester 
Company, 148 Conn. 527; 172 A.2d 614 (1961). In Stem, plaintiff and defendant had entered 
into a distributorship agreement, which was terminable at will by either party upon written 
notice. Id. at 616. After defendant breached the agreement, it claimed that it had no liability 
because the contract was thereafter terminated by plaintiff Id. However, the Stem court 
disagreed, noting as follows: 
"When a contract. . . contains a provisional option giving the right or privilege of 
cancellation and the agreement is canceled in pursuance of the right [or] privilege 
thus given, such cancellation does not extinguish liabilities that have already 
accrued under the contract. . . regardless of whether the liability is that of the 
party who exercised the option to cancel the agreement or [as in the instant case] 
is the liability of the party against whom cancellation is made." 
Id. at 530 (quoting 166 A.L.R. 391). As further noted by the Stem court, "[t]he cancellation 
does not preclude or diminish any rights to recover damages for injuries proximately resulting 
from the admitted antecedent breach." Id. See also Factory Realty Corporation v. Corbin-
Holmes Shoe Company, 312 Mass. 325; 44 N.E. 2d 671 (1942) (power to terminate contract 
does not absolve party for liability arising from prior breach.) Accordingly, until the termination 
was effective, all covenants and duties of the agreement remained intact. See Stem, 172 A.2d at 
614 (contract remains operative until "effective date of cancellation"). 
B. Hokeiko Materially Breached the Settlement Agreement. 
Paragraph 4 of the Settlement Agreement provides that so long as this Agreement 
is in effect, Hokeiko shall take no action to impede or frustrate the eventual grant of the CTTC 
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application."). Even assuming that Hokeiko had the right to terminate the Settlement 
Agreement, by Hokeiko's own calculation, the Agreement remained in effect through October 
18, 1997. There are two occasions on which Hokeiko materially breached the Settlement 
Agreement prior to that date, giving rise to claim for relief. 
In the first instance, Hokeiko admits that its counsel, in August, 1997, contacted Ms. 
Ayers, an FCC staff analyst who processes applications and settlement agreements, and informed 
her that Hokeiko was "considering" terminating the Settlement Agreement. (Affidavit of Irving 
Gastfreund, dated November 12, 1997, ("Gastfreund Aff." 15.) (R.512). The intent and import 
of this statement is quite obvious. Hokeiko had no legitimate reason to inform Ms. Ayers of its 
intent to terminate the Settlement Agreement, other than to discourage Ms. Ayers from 
completing the processing of CTTC's application. The discussion Mr. Gastfreund had with 
Ms. Ayers is analogous to a party to a lawsuit, which has a pending motion to approve a 
settlement agreement before the court, advising the court's clerk that it may back out of the 
settlement agreement. 
For purposes of Hokeiko's summary judgment motion, the trial court should have 
inferred, that the result, if not the intent, of Hokeiko's actions was to discourage Ms. Ayers from 
preparing and submitting the paperwork needed to secure FCC approval of the Settlement 
Agreement. It is also significant to note that, at the time the trial court considered the summary 
judgment motion, CTTC had filed a motion contending Hokeiko had deliberately disregarded a 
court order compelling the production of the billing statement of Mr. Gastfreund. (R.825-838). 
The billing statements could have shed further light on the efforts taken by Mr. Gastfreund on 
Hokeiko's behalf to delay the FCC approval process. In short, the trial court should not have 
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granted summary judgment, dismissing CTTC's claim against Hokeiko for its August, 1997 
breach arising out of its contact with the FCC. 
Second, and more significantly, on October 8, 1997, prior to serving notice of 
termination, Hokeiko contacted Ms. Ayers at the FCC, and notifying her of its intent to withdraw 
from the Settlement Agreement and to reinstate his own application. (Gastfreund Aff, f 6.) 
(R.510). After notifying CTTC of the termination, Hokeiko followed up on the phone call by 
copying the FCC with the letter of intent to withdraw, and by filing with the FCC, on that same 
date, its Withdrawal Notice (R.510-511). By filing the Withdrawal Notice, Hokeiko willfully 
breached the Settlement Agreement. In its Withdrawal Notice, Hokeiko stated that: "Hokeiko 
hereby withdraws completely from the Commission its participation in the December 14, 1995 
Joint Request For Approval of Settlement Agreement and hereby withdraws that pleading in its 
entirety." (R.522). 
While, Hokeiko will argue that the Withdrawal Notice was an immaterial breach because 
it was served two days after the Letter Ruling had issued, Hokeiko takes the opposite position 
with the FCC. In its petition for reconsideration, Hokeiko contends the Withdrawal Notice filed 
on October 8, was intended to and should have led to the derailment of CTTC's application. 
Hokeiko contends that as a result of its Withdrawal Notice, it was erroneous for the FCC to 
approve CTTC's permit. Hokeiko argued as follows: 
Hence, the filing by Hokeiko with the Commission on October 8, 1997 of 
Hokeiko's Notice of Withdrawal occurred a full week prior to the October 15, 
1997 effective date of the Letter Ruling. This was clearly more than sufficient 
time for the Commission and its staff to be on notice as to the fact that Hokeiko 
had taken action to effectuate its withdrawal from the Settlement Agreement. 
In light of all the foregoing, it is clear that the Commission's Letter Ruling was 
improvidently issued, in that it improperly and improvidently dismissed Hokeiko's 
above-captioned application and improvidently and improperly granted CTTC's 
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above-captioned application. The Commission clearly should have continued to 
maintain the viability of Hokeiko's application and should have continued to 
process it. Consequently, the grant by the Commission of CTTC's application, in 
light of the pendency of Hokeiko's application, was improper under Ashbacker 
Radio Corp. v. F.C.C., 326 U.S. 327 (1945). 
(R.537). 
Consequently, Hokeiko is estopped from contending before this court that the Withdrawal 
Notice constitutes an immaterial breach. Since Hokeiko's actions before the FCC are not a 
matter of bona fide factual dispute, this Court must set aside the trial court's granting of summary 
judgment in favor of defendant, and direct the entry of an order granting summary judgment in 
favor of CTTC on the issue of liability. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO CONSIDER WHETHER CTTC 
WAIVED THE CONDITION PRECEDENT OF FINALITY. 
While the trial court considered and ruled that Hokeiko had the right to invoke the 
termination provision of the Settlement Agreement, it was error for the court to grant Hokeiko 
summary judgment without first determining whether CTTC had the right to, and in fact waived 
the condition precedent of finality prior to the effective date of termination. Significantly, in its 
withdrawal notice filed with the FCC on October 8, 1997, Hokeiko's FCC counsel expressly 
noted that the termination would not be effective until October 18, 1997. (R521). One day prior 
to the effective date of purported termination, on October 17, 1997, CTTC notified Hokeiko that 
it would waive the condition precedent of finality, and tendered full payment of the settlement 
amount. (R.592). Since the condition of finality operated for its benefit, CTTC had the right to 
waive the condition precedent and seek to enforce the underlying Settlement Agreement. 
A. The Existence of a Condition Precedent May Be Waived. 
It is a well settled rule of law that a party for whose benefit a condition is included 
448060vl -21-
in a contract may waive the condition and accept performance of the contract as is. 81 C.J.S., 
Specific Performance, 57. The facts in this case are analogous to the facts present in DiLeonardo 
v. Paoline, 161 N.Y.S. 2d 660 (1956). In DiLeonardo, the plaintiff/purchaser sought specific 
performance of a real estate contract which provided for cancellation of the contract in the event 
the realty could not be rezoned. The property was not rezoned. The court noted that since the 
rezoning contingency was for the buyer's benefit, the buyer was entitled to waive this condition 
and seek specific performance and accept the property as is. 
Also, in Caras v. Parker, 309 P.2d 104 (Cal.App. 1957), a real estate contract was made 
contingent upon the buyer obtaining city approval to subdivide the subject property. The court 
held that by waiving the contingency of the approval and tendering performance, the buyer had 
the right to seek specific performance of the contract. 
Finally, in National Supermarkets, Inc. v. The First National Bank of Springfield, 390 
N.E. 2d 602 (111. App. 1979), the plaintiff sought specific performance of a real estate contract, 
under which terms the buyer had the right to rescind the option in the event it became necessary 
to pursue litigation to receive clear title to the property. The court concluded that the buyer 
waived the condition precedent and tendered performance of the agreement prior to the effective 
date of the seller's 30 day notice of cancellation, and therefore was entitled to an award of 
specific performance. Id. at 608. In so holding, the court recognized the general rule that 
specific performance should be granted where the plaintiff has waived the benefit of a condition 
precedent which was for his protection. Id. at 607 (citing 81 CJ.S. Specific Performance @ 57, 
850,(1977)). 
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B. The Condition of FCC Finality Was Imposed for the Benefit of CTTC. 
Here, there can be no argument but that the condition of final FCC approval was 
imposed for the benefit of CTTC. By the Settlement Agreement, CTTC agreed to pay to 
Hokeiko the sum of $65,000 in consideration for which Hokeiko agreed to withdraw its 
competing application, and to take no action to impede the grant of CTTC's application. Under 
the terms of the Settlement Agreement, at If 3, CTTC's obligation to make the $65,000 settlement 
payment was expressly conditioned upon CTTC receiving final approval of its application from 
the FCC. Consistent with the expectation of the sellers in the cases identified as described, upon 
entering into the Settlement Agreement, Hokeiko's only remaining expectation was to receive a 
timely payment of the settlement amount of $65,000. By imposing the condition precedent of 
FCC finality, however, CTTC had assurance that it would not have to pay the $65,000 settlement 
payment without receiving final FCC approval. By agreeing to waive the condition of finality on 
October 17, 1997, CTTC agreed to pay the full settlement amount, and assumed the risk of 
finality, for which it previously bargained to avoid. 
C. CTTC Waived the Condition Precedent of Finality and Tendered Performance of 
the Settlement Agreement. 
In the trial court below, Hokeiko questioned whether by the Tender Letter, CTTC 
manifested its intent to waive the condition precedent and tendered payment of the settlement 
amount. In the Tender Letter, Mr. Wood identified the stated premise of the letter: "The point 
of this fax is that we are willing to overlook the breaches if Hokeiko will get back on board." 
(R.592). It was CTTC's position was that the Settlement Agreement remained in full force and 
effect: "The agreement was still in effect on October 8, and is still in effect, as the notice period 
is not up yet." (R.592). Moreover, by the time the letter was sent, the FCC had approved 
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CTTC's application and served public notice of its approval, the only remaining condition 
precedent was for the FCC order to become a "final" order. By the letter, CTTC clearly and 
unequivocally agreed to waive the requirement of finality. "...I am willing to stand by our earlier 
offer to pay your client the proceeds of the settlement early, without waiting for finality." 
(R.592, emphasis added). 
Therefore, Hokeiko's contention that the Tender Letter was not intended to serve as a 
waiver of the remaining condition precedents to payment has no merit and does not give rise to a 
factual dispute. The trial court erred, by failing to grant CTTC summary judgment, and hold that 
as a result of the tender of payment, CTTC is entitled to pursue enforcement of the Settlement 
Agreement. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO CONSIDER WHETHER 
HOKEIKO WAS ESTOPPED FROM TERMINATING THE SETTLEMENT 
AGREEMENT. 
By granting summary judgment against CTTC, the trial court rejected without discussion 
or analysis CTTC's contention that Hokeiko was estopped from terminating the Settlement 
Agreement. Below, CTTC argued that even if Hokeiko had the right to terminate the Settlement 
Agreement, it was inappropriate for the court to grant summary judgment without affording 
CTTC an opportunity to present evidence at trial that Hokeiko by its conduct was estopped from 
effectuating such a termination. 
The Utah Supreme Court has long since recognized that "no one can avail himself of the 
nonperformance of a condition precedent, who has itself occasioned its non-performance." 
Cannon v. Stevens School of Bus., Inc., 560 P.2d 1383, 1385 (Utah 1977). Likewise, more 
recently the court noted that "[p]arties to a contract are obliged to proceed in good faith and to 
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cooperate in the performance of the contract in accordance with its expressed intent. One party 
cannot by willful act or omission make it impossible or difficult for the other to perform and then 
invoke the other's non-performance as a defense." Cahoon v. Cahoon, 641 P.2d 140, 144 (Utah 
1982). 
For purposes of summary judgment, the trial court could infer that the FCC contacted 
Hokeiko in August concerning the Settlement Agreement either (1) because it was prepared to 
issue a ruling on the pending Settlement Agreement or (2) because Ms. Ayers was responding to 
a call from Mr. Gastfreund. The court could also infer that as a result of Hokeiko's statement 
that it was considering withdrawing from the Settlement Agreement, that the FCC delayed ruling 
for the additional two months, thereby buying Hokeiko additional time to perhaps negotiate a 
"better deal" with a third party. By granting summary judgment for Hokeiko, the trial court erred 
by denying CTTC the opportunity to prove at trial that but for Hokeiko's earlier efforts to delay 
FCC consideration of CTTC s application, the Settlement Agreement could have been approved 
back in August, with finality occurring prior to Hokeiko's decision to terminate the Agreement 
on October 8, 1997. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, CTTC respectfully requests that the court reverse the ruling of the 
trial court setting aside the order granting summary judgment in favor of Hokeiko and against 
CTTC, and remand the proceeding to the trial court with instructions to grant CTTC partial 
summary judgment declaring that the Settlement Agreement remains in full force and effect, and 
that Hokeiko acted in breach of the Settlement Agreement by its actions on October 8, 1997 
before the FCC. 
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DATED this 22nd day of May, 2000. 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
By. Q72. 
Jerome Romero 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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ADDENDUM A 
1 
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
This Settlement Agreement ("Settlement Agreement") is entered into by and 
between Hokeiko Broadcasting Company ("Hokeiko") and Channel Twenty Television 
Company ("CTTC"), collectively the "Parties." 
WHEREAS the Parties have filed apphcations with the Federal Communications 
Commission ("Commission") for a construction permit for a new UHF television station 
on Channel 20 at Salt Lake City, Utah (the "Station") which are currently pending; 
WHEREAS two other applicants, KM Communications, Inc. ("KM") and Front 
Range Broadcasting Company ("FRBC") have similar apphcations pending for Channel 
/ 
20 in Salt Lake City and Channel 24 in Ogden, Utah, respectively; 
WHEREAS the apphcations of the Parties are subject to a comparative hearing, 
although KM has requested dismissal of the Hokeiko and FRBC apphcations; and, 
WHEREAS the Parties believe that the dismissal of all but one of the competing 
apphcations would serve the pubhc interest by permitting prompt institution of new 
television service to Salt Lake City. 
THEREFORE, the Parties, in light of the foregoing facts and their several 
covenants and promises contained herein, hereby agree and contract as follows, subject 
to the approval of the Commission: 
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1. At the same time that the Joint Petition for Approval of this Settlement 
Agreement ("Joint Petition") is filed with the Commission in accordance with Paragraph 
4 hereof, Hokeiko shall request the dismissal with prejudice of its application, in 
consideration for which CTTC will compensate Hokeiko according to the terms provided 
in Attachment A hereto. Such request for dismissal shall be conditioned on approval 
of this Settlement Agreement 
2. A "Final Order" for purposes of this Settlement Agreement means an Order 
of the Commission (or any of its officials acting pursuant to delegated authority) as to 
which the time for filing a petition for reconsideration, application for review or a court 
appeal, and the time within which the Commission may review said Order on its own 
motion, have expired and no such petition for reconsideration, application for review or 
court appeal has been timely filed and the Commission has not reviewed said Order on 
its own motion or, in the event of any such petition, application, appeal or action being 
filed or taken, such petition, application, appeal or action shall have been disposed of 
and the time for seeking further review of the Commission's Order shall have expired 
without any request for such further review having been filed. 
3. This Settlement Agreement is conditioned upon, and the obligation of 
CTTC to make the payment required pursuant to Paragraph 1 of this Settlement 
Agreement shall not arise unless and until, the following conditions are met (hereinafter 
"conditions precedent"): 
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a. An Order has been issued and has become a Final Order dismissing with 
prejudice the Hokeiko application for Channel 20 in Salt Lake City and approving 
this Settlement Agreement 
b. An Order has been issued and has become a Final Order (or separate 
Orders have been issued and have become Final Orders) dismissing with prejudice 
the FRBC and KM applications. 
c. An Order has been issued and has become a Final Order granting the 
application of CTTC. 
d. All of the terms and conditions of this Settlement Agreement have been 
met. 
4. On the date of the execution hereof, the Parties will promptly prepare and 
file with the Commission's Video Services Division a Joint Petition pursuant to Section 
73.3525 of the Commission's Rules, and shall promptly thereafter file for association 
therewith such statements and other supporting materials as may be necessary or 
appropriate, requesting that the Division approve this Settlement Agreement and take 
such further action as is contemplated hereby. The Parties will use their best efforts and 
cooperate to the extent necessary to prepare and file whatever documents may be 
required to seek and obtain final Commission approval of this Settlement Agreement 
Further, so long as this Agreement is in effect, Hokeiko shall take no action to impede 
or frustrate the eventual grant of the CTTC application. 
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5. The Parties agree to maintain the confidentiality of the terms of this 
Settlement Agreement unless and until such time as a Joint Petition is filed with the 
Commission pursuant to Paragraph 4. 
6. In the event of default by one Party in the performance of the obligations 
imposed upon the Parties to this Settlement Agreement, the other Party shall be entitled 
to pursue any remedies for redress of injuries from such default that are available at law 
or in equity or otherwise, including reasonable attorneys' fees and court costs incurred 
in enforcing this Settlement Agreement In addition, Hokeiko acknowledges that CTTC 
has no adequate remedy at law if Hokeiko shall fail to perfonn any of its obligations 
hereunder, and Hokeiko confirms and agrees that CTTC's rights to specific performance 
are essential to protect CTTC's rights and interests. Accordingly, Hokeiko hereby agrees 
that, in addition to whatever remedy CTTC may elect to pursue, CTTC shall have the 
right to such specific performance of this Settlement Agreement, and Hokeiko agrees 
to waive the defense that CTTC has an adequate remedy at law and to interpose no 
objection, legal or otherwise, to the propriety of specific performance as a remedy. 
7. This Settlement Agreement shall be governed and construed under the laws 
of the State of Utah, the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, and the 
Commission's Rules and Regulations. 
8. Each Party represents to the other that (a) it is not under any restrictions, 
contractual or otherwise, which are inconsistent with this Settlement Agreement or which 
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would prevent or preclude such Party from entering into this Settlement Agreement or 
from performing such Party's obligations hereunder; and (b) this Settlement Agreement 
is a legally binding obhgation of such Party and is enforceable against such Party in 
accordance with its terms. This Settlement Agreement shall be binding upon and shall 
inure to the benefit of the Parties and their respective successors, heirs and assigns. 
9. Any notice with regard to this Settlement Agreement shall be in writing and 
shall be deemed given when received via overnight courier service to the following: 
For CTTC: 
Isaac Max Jaramillo 
131 N. 900 West / 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
with copy to: 
Bany D. Wood, Esquire 
Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough 
Suite 900 
2300 M Street, RW. 
Washington, D.C 20037 
For Hokeiko: 
Gany A Spire 
16500 Akron Street 
Pacific Palisades, California 90272 
with copy to: 
Irving Gastfreund, Esquire 
Kaye, Scholer et aL 
901 15th Street, NW, Suite 1100 
Washington, D.C 20036 
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10. This Settlement Agreement, including Attachment A, constitutes the entire 
understanding of the Parties and supersedes any prior or contemporaneous written or 
oral agreements or understandings between them. No modification, amendment or 
waiver of any provision of this Settlement Agreement, in whole or in part, will be valid 
unless in writing signed by the Parties. 
11. This Settlement Agreement may be executed in one or more counterparts, 
each of which shall be deemed an original, and all counterparts so executed shall 
constitute one agreement, binding on the Parties hereto, notwithstandingthat the Parties 
are not signatory to the same counterpart. • • ' . " . 
12. The execution of this Agreement by each Party shall constitute the executing 
individual's declaration under penalty of perjury, affirming for purposes of Section 
73.3525(a) of the Commission's Rules, (a) that its respective application with the 
Commission was not filed for the purpose of reaching or carrying out this or any other 
settlement agreement; (b) that this Settlement Agreement constitutes the entire 
agreement between the Parties and sets forth all consideration between the Parties; and 
(c) it believes that this Settlement Agreement, after Commission approval, will serve the 
pubhc interest because it will expedite the inauguration of a new UHF television service 
to Salt Lake City, Utah and will either obviate the need for further proceedings or reduce 
the number of comparative applicants, thereby conserving the Commission's resources. 
P*£c7of7 
13. If the Commission or itt delegate for any reason fails to approve this 
Settlement Agreement, to grant the CTTC application, and to dismiss the competing 
applications within twelve months after the submission of the Joint Petition requestin£ 
such approval; or, if approved, such tu^iou% do not become Final Orders, then either 
Party may terminate this Settlement Agreement upon ten day*' written notice to the 
other, following which Hokeiko shall be entitled to resume prosecution of its application. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Parties have executed this Agreement c&cdivc 
as of this 14th Day of December, 1995. 
CHANNEL TWENTY TELEVISION HOKEIKO BROADCASTING 
COMPANY COMPANY 
( 
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13, . If the Commission or its delegate for any reason fails to approve this 
Settlement Agreement, to grant the CTTC application, and to dismiss the competing 
applications within twelve months after the submission of the Joint Petition requesting 
such approval; or, if approved, such actions do not become Final Orders, then either 
Party may terminate this Settlement Agreement upon ten days' written notice to the 
other, fbltowins whichHokciko shall be entitled to resume prosecution of its application. 
IN WTINESS WHEREOF, the Parties have executed this Agreement effective 
as of this 14th Day of December, 1995. 
CHANNEL TWENTY TELEVISION HOKEIKO BROADCASTING , 
S O O £ P A N Y COMPANY 
^^^^oJhxAQmil^] ' „. 
—"y 
ATTACHMENT A 
Payment of the consideration set forth in Paragraph 1 of the foregoing Settlement 
Agreement shall be made by wire transfer or by cheek in the amount of Sixty-Five 
Thousand Dollars ($65,000). Such fundi ihill be wired to an account designated by, or 
iuch check delivered to, Irving Ga^tfrcund, ai attorney for Hokclko Broadcasting 
Company, at the address noted in Paragraph 9, or before the fort business day thirty days 
following the latest of (a) the date of a Commission Order approving this Settlement 
Agreement, (b) the date of a Commission Order dismissing the FRBC application, (c) 
the date of a Commission Order dismissing the KM application, or (d) the date of a 
Commission Order granting to CTTC a construction permit for^e Station becomes a 
Final Orders), / 
Read and Approved: 
HOKBKO BROADCASTING COMPANY 
^ 
»~i*V"" 
Read and Approved; 
CHANNEL TWENTY TEUEVISION 
COMPANY 
Luuic Mix Jaramilio 
President 
ATTACHMENT A 
Payment of the consideration set forth in Paragraph 1 of the foregoing Settlement 
Agreement shall be made by wire transfer or by check in the amount of Sixty-Five 
Thousand Dollars ($65,000). Such foadxshafl be vared to an account designated by, _or 
such check delivered to, Irving Oastfreund, as attorney for Hokeiko Broadcasting 
Company, at the address noted in Paragraph 9, or before the first businew day thirty days 
fonowing the latest of (a) the date of a Commission Order approving this Settlement 
Agreement, (b) the date of a Commission Order dismissing the ERBC application, (c) 
the c*ate of a Commission Order dkniflring the KM application, or (d) the date of a
 ( 
Commission Order granting to CITC a construction permit for the Station becomes a 
Final Qrder(s). 
Read and Approved: -
HOKEIKO.BROADCASTING COMPANY 
Read and Approved: 
CHANNEL 'TWENTY TELEVISION 
COMPANY 
>7 
Isaac Max Jaraniiflo 
President . 
ADDENDUM B 
BEFORE THE 
$ehetul (KmntttuntratixmH (EammiBBhm 
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20554 
In re Applications of 
KM COMMUNICATIONS, INC. 
CHANNEL TWENTY TELEVISION COMPANY 
GARRY A. SPIRE d/b/a 
HOKEIKO BROADCASTING COMPANY 
For Construction Permit For 
A New UHF Television Station 
On Channel 20 in Salt Lake City, Utah 
FRONT RANGE BROADCASTING COMPANY 
For Construction Permit For 
A New UHF Television Station 
On Channel 24 in Ogden, Utah 
TO: Television Branch, Video Services Division, 
Mass Media Bureau 
MM Docket No. 
File No. BPCT-950109KE 
File No. BPCT-950320KK 
File No. BPCT-950321KG 
File No. BPCT-950321KH 
WTTHDRA WAL OF JOINT REQUEST 
FOR APPROVAL OF SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
GARRY A. SPIRE d/b/a HOKEIKO BROADCASTING COMPANY ("Hokeiko"), one 
of the above-captioned applicants for a construction permit for a new UHF television station on 
Channel 20 in Salt Lake City, Utah, by its attorneys, hereby withdraws from the Commission the 
December 14, 1995 Joint Request For Approval of Settlement Agreement in this case, effective 
as of October 18, 1997. This ten-day prior notification is required under the Settlement 
Agreement, but the Commission is being notified of the withdrawal immediately as described 
below. In support whereof, it is shown as follows: 
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KM Communications, inc., ("KM"), Hokeiko, and Channel 20 Television Company 
("CTTC") are each applicants for a construction permit for a new UHF television station on 
Channel 20 in Salt Lake City, Utah. Front Range Broadcasting Company ("FRBC") is an 
applicant for a construction permit for a new UHF television station on Channel 24 in Ogden, 
Utah. On December 14, 12995, a Joint Request for Approval of Settlement Agreement was 
tendered for filing with the Commission on behalf of KM, Hokeiko, CTTC land FRBC, in which 
those parties requested Commission approval of certain Settlement Agreements annexed to that 
Joint Request. The Settlement Agreements contemplated dismissal of the respective applications 
of KM. Hokeiko and FRBC and the grant of CTTC's above-captioned application for Channel 20 
<• 
in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
/ 
The aforementioned Joint Request For Approval of Settlement Agreement has now been 
pending before the Commission for one and three-quarters years, and no action has as yet been 
taken on the Joint Request by the Commission. Under the provisions of Paragraph 13 of the 
December 14, 1995 Settlement Agreement by and among Hokeiko and CTTC, if the 
Commission for any reason fails to approve the Settlement Agreement and fails to grant CTTC's 
application for a construction permit for Channel 20 in Salt Lake City and to dismiss the 
competing applications, all within 12 months after the date of submission to the Commission of 
the December 14, 1995 Joint Request For Approval of Settlement Agreement (i.e., by 
December 15, 1996); or, if approved by the Commission if such actions do not become Final 
Orders (as defined in Paragraph 2 of the Settlement Agreement between Hokeiko and CTTC), 
then either Hokeiko or CTTC may terminate the Settlement Agreement upon ten days' written 
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notice 10 the other, following which Hokeiko is entitled to resume the prosecution of its above-
captioned application. 
Based on the provisions of Paragraph 13 of the Settlement Agreement between Hokeiko 
and CTTC, Hokeiko has notified CTTC that, effective October 18, 1997, the Settlement 
Agreement would be terminated. Such termination would be effective immediately to reflect 
Hokeiko's present intentions but for the fact that the Sc^lcmtut Agreement provides a minimum 
of 10 days' written notice from Hokeiko to CTTC That notice expires on October 18, 1997. 
In light of all the foregoing, Hokeiko hereby withdraws completely from the Commission 
/ 
its participation in the December 14, 1995 Joint Request For Approval of Settlement Agreement 
and hereby withdraws that pleading in its entirety. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GARRY A. SPIRE d/b/a 
HOKEIKO BROADCASTING COMPANY 
^^^h^cr^^^r 
Irving Gas'tfreund , ' 
Kaye, Scholer, Herman, Hays & Handler,. LLP 
901 15th Street, N.W., Suite 1100 
Washington, D.C. 20005 
(202) 682-3526 
Its Attorneys 
October 8, 1997 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
L Mary Odder, a secretary in the law firm of Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler, 
LLP, do hereby certify that, on this 8th day of October, 1997, a copy of die foregoing 
Withdrawal of Joint Request For Approval of Settlement Agreement, was transmitted via hand-
delivery or via U.S. mail, postage prepaid, to the offices of the following: 
Clay C. Pendarvis, Esq. 
Chief, Television Branch 
Video Services Division 
Mass Media Bureau 
Federal Communications Commission 
1919 M Street, NW, Room 702 
Washington, D.C. 20554 
Mary M. Fitzgerald, Esq. 
Television Branch 
Video Services Division 
Mass Media Bureau 
Federal Communications Commission 
1919 M Street, N.W., Room 702 
Washington, D.C 20554 
Ms. Salina Ayers 
Broadcast Analyst 
Video Services Division 
Mass Media Bureau 
Federal Communications Commission 
1919 M Street, NW, Room 702 
Washington, D.C 20554 
Bany D. Wood, Esq. 
Wood & Brinton, Chartered 
2300 M Street, NW, Suite 900 
Washington, D.C. 20554 
Counsel for Channel Twenty Television Company 
Alan C. Campbell, Esq. 
Irwin, Campbell & Tannenwald, P.C 
1320 18th Street, NW, Suite 400 
Washington, D.C. 20036 
Counsel for KM Communications, Inc. 
A^/^J^C/ 
Odder 
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ADDENDUM C 
Federal Communications Commission 
Washington, D.C 20554 
OCT 6 1997 
1800E1-SA 
KM Communications, Inc. 
c/o Alan C. Campbell, Esq. 
Irwin, Campbell & Tannenwald P.C. 
Suite 200 
1730 Rhode Island Avenue, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20036 
Channel 20 Television Company 
c/o Barry Wood, Esq. 
Wood & Brinton 
Suite 900A 
2300 M Street, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20037 
Garry A. Spire d/b/a 
Hokeiko Broadcasting Company 
Lawrence H. Rogow d/b/a 
Front Range Broadcasting 
Company 
c/o Irving, Gastfreund, Esq. 
Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, 
Hays & Handler 
Suite 1100 
901 15th Street, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20005 
Re: KM Communications, Inc. 
BPCT-950109KE 
Channel 20 Television 
Company 
BPCT-950320KK 
Garry A. Spire d/b/a 
Hokeiko Broadcasting 
BPCT-950321KG 
Channel 20 
Salt Lake City 
Front Range Broadcasting 
BPCT-950321KH 
Channel 24 
Ogden, Utah 
Dear Counselors: 
This refers to the December 14, 1995, joint request by the above-
described applicants for approval of a joint settlement agreement 
to resolve a conflict among their applications in accordance with 
Section 73.3525 of the Commission's Rules. KM Communications, 
Inc. (KM), Channel 20 Television Company (CTC),x and Hokeiko 
Broadcasting Company (Hokeiko) are competing applicants for a 
construction permit for a new commercial television station on 
Channel 20 in Salt Lake City, Utah; and Front Range Broadcasting 
Company (Front Range) is an applicant for Channel 24 in Ogden, 
Utah. A petition to deny was filed against Hokeiko and Front 
Range by KM Communications, Inc.2 
The agreement resolves all issues raised by the mutually 
exclusive applications. The agreement provides for the dismissal 
of KM's application in exchange for the payment by CTC of 
$350,000; and the dismissal of Hokeiko's and Front Range's 
applications in exchange for the payment by CTC of $65,000 to 
each. 
This agreement has been reviewed and the Commission finds no 
reason to believe that any party to the agreement filed its 
application for the purpose of reaching or carrying out such an 
agreement. The Commission further finds that/the agreement is in 
compliance with the Commission's rules and policies and that its 
approval would be in the public interest. See Public Notice, FCC 
95-391, released September 15, 1995. 
Accordingly, the Agreement IS APPROVED; the applications of KM 
Communications, Inc. Hokeiko Broadcasting Company and Front Range 
Broadcasting Company ARE DISMISSED; and the petitions to deny ARE 
*CTC requested a temporary waiver of the one to a market 
rule in order to divest its ownership interest in KOOG(TV), 
Ogden, Utah (BAPLCT-960906IB). However, that request is moot 
because the assignment application was granted November 6, 1996, 
and the transaction consummated June 30, 1997. 
2We have fully considered the matters set forth in the 
petition to deny and conclude that there are no substantial and 
material questions of fact that would warrant any further 
inquiry. 
DISMISSED as moot. Further, having found the applicant qualified 
and that grant of the application would serve the public 
interest, convenience and necessity, the application of Channel 
20 Television Company, IS GRANTED. 
Sincerel 
Clay C. Pendarvis 
Chief, Television Branch 
Video Services Division 
Mass Media Bureau 
/ 
ADDENDUM D 
TELECOPY TRANSHIATAL 
WOOD & BRINTON, Chartered 
2300 M Street, N.W., Suite 900A 
Washington, D-C. 20037 
(202) 293-5333 
Telecopier: (202) 293-2509 
Date: October 17, 1997 
Time: 2:22 pm_ 
TO; Irv Gastfreund 
FROM: Barry Wood 
Total Pages: 1 
(including this page) 
MESSAGE: 
I am sorry that I was not available when you called the other day, I 
called you back as soon as I returned to the office, but maybe you did 
not get the message• 
I received your letter of the 8th on October 9. It says that it was 
sent by facsimile and federal express, but we never received any fax of 
the document• No matter. / 
In our view, the filing with the FCC is, notwithstanding the "effec-
tive date" notation, a breach of the settlement agreement- The agree-
ment was still in effect on October 8, and is still in effect, as the 
notice period is not up yet. 
There are other breaches, too, that were committed while the agreement 
was unquestionably effective, but there is no need to get into those in 
this fax* The point of this fax is that we are willing to overlook the 
breaches if Hokeiko will get back on board. 
On the assumption that you and your client have subsequently come to 
your senses, my client and I are willing to stand by our earlier offer 
to pay your client the proceeds of the settlement early*, without wait-
ing for finality- In fact, we will go so far as to pay not only Mr-
Spire but also his colleague Mr. Rogow, despite his own breach of the 
Channel 24 agreement-
In short, I have a couple of checks for you. Please call so that we 
can close this out, in connection with a withdrawal of the October 8 
filing. 
! •"",l ' '" " I " 1 - ' [ mimtmrnt ,
 { ,, ^ 
THIS FACSIMILE IS INTENOED CULT FOR THE INDIVIDUAL TO WHOM IT IS AD0RESSED AND CONTAINS INFORMATION THAT 
IS PRIVILEGED, CONFIDENTIAL AMD OQEKT FROM DISCLOSURE W©ER APPLICABLE LA*/. IF YOU, THE READER OF THIS 
FACSIMILE, ARE HOT THE IHTENDE0 RECIPIENT, OR THE AUTHORIZED EMPLOYEE OR AGENT Of THE INTEK0E0 
RECIPIENT, YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED THAT ANT 01SSEMINATION, DISTRIBUTION OR COPYING OF THIS COMMUNICATION 
IS STRICTLY PROHIBITED, YOU ARE TO MOTIFY US IltOIATELY BY TELEPHONE (CALL COLLECT). PLEASE MAIL THE 
ORIGINAL MESSAGE TO US AT THE A80VE ADDRESS, VE U1LL REIMBURSE POSTAGE CHARGES. 
ADDENDUM E 
BEFORE THE 
JFefceral (tauttmttrafumja (EmttmteHtim 
WASHINGTON. D.C. 80854 
In re Applications of 
KM COMMUNICATIONS, INC. 
CHANNEL TWENTY TELEVISION COMPANY 
GARRY A. SPIRE d/b/a 
HOKEIKO BROADCASTING COMPANY 
For Construction Permit For 
A New UHF Television Station 
On Channel 20 in Salt Lake City, Utah 
FRONT RANGE BROADCASTING COMPANY 
For Construction Permit For 
A New UHF Television Station 
On Channel 24 in Ogden, Utah 
MM Docket No. 
File No. BPCT-950109KE 
File No. BPCT-950320KK 
FileNo.BPCT-950321KG 
FileNo.BPCT-950321KH 
TO: Television Branch, Video Services Division. 
Mass Media Bureau 
PETITION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
Irving Gastfreund, Esq. 
Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler, LLP 
901 15th Street, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20005 
November 12, 1997 
i. 
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ii. 
Summary 
The Letter Ruling of the Video Service Division and the issuance of the Video Service 
Division of its construction permit to CTTC for Channel 20 in Salt Lake City, Utah, were 
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, contrary to law and established practice, and wholly 
improvident and improper. For the reasons set forth above, dismissal of Hokeiko's above-
captioned application by the Video Services Division was improper; Hokeiko's application must 
continue to be processed and should not have been dismissed. Moreover, for the reasons set 
forth above, grant of Hokeiko's application pursuant to the Settlement Agreement was improper, 
since there was no longer a universal settlement, in light of Hokeiko's withdrawal. Moreover, 
grant by the Commission of CTTC's captioned application was improper in any event, and 
arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of discretion, in light of CTTC's manifest abuse of process in 
its clear efforts to impede, obstruct and prevent Hokeiko from bringing advance facts to the 
attention of the Commission, Plainly, CTTC lacks the requisite character qualifications to be and 
remain a Commission permittee and licensee. In light of all the foregoing, the Mass Media 
Bureau (Video Service Division) should expeditiously reconsider and vacate its Letter Ruling 
and should expeditiously rescind its grant of the CTTC construction permit for Channel 20 in 
Salt Lake City, Utah, the Mass Media Bureau should also expeditiously reinstate Hokeiko's 
above-captioned application to pending status and thereupon continue to process Hokeiko's 
application in the ordinary course. 
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BEFORE THE 
Xtbttul (Enrnmrnttratimtfi (HammtBBion 
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20554 
In re Applications of 
KM COMMUNICATIONS, INC 
CHANNEL TWENTY TELEVISION COMPANY 
GARRY A. SPIRE d/b/a 
HOKEIKO BROADCASTING COMPANY 
For Construction Permit For 
A New UHF Television Station 
On Channel 20 in Salt Lake City, Utah 
FRONT RANGE BROADCASTING COMPANY 
For Construction Permit For 
A New UHF Television Station 
On Channel 24 in Ogden, Utah 
TO: Television Branch, Video Services Division, 
Mass Media Bureau 
MM Docket No. 
File No. BPCT-950109KE 
File No. BPCT-950320KK 
FileNo.BPCT-950321KG 
File No. BPCT-950321KH 
PETITION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
GARRY A. SPIRE d/b/a HOKEIKO BROADCASTING COMPANY ("Hokeiko"), one 
of the above-captioned applicants for a construction permit for a new UHF television station on 
Channel 20 in Salt Lake City, Utah, by its attorneys, pursuant to Section 405 of the 
Communications Act of 1934, as amended, and pursuant to Section LI 06 of the Commission's 
Rules, hereby submits its instant Petition For Reconsideration with respect to the letter ruling of 
the Chief of the Television Branch of the Video Services Division of the Commission's Mass 
Media Bureau, which bears the stamped date of "October 6, 1997" (FCC Ref No. 1800E10SA) 
(hereinafter "Letter Ruling"); and with respect to the construction permit (FCC File No. BPCT-
Doc #12153889.DC 
950320KK) puiportedly issued by the Commission to Channel Twenty Television Company, 
L.L.C on October 6, 1997, to implement the Letter Ruling, For convenience, a copy of the 
Letter Ruling is annexed hereto as Exhibit l.1 In support whereof, it is shown as follows: 
On or about March 21, 1995, Hokeiko tendered for filing with the Commission its above-
captioned application for a construction permit for a new UHF television station on Channel 20 
in Salt Lake City, Utah. According to Commission records, on or about March 20, 1995, 
Channel Twenty Television Company, L.L.C. (hereinafter "CTTC") filed a competing 
application for a construction permit for a new UHF television station on Channel 20 in Salt 
Lake City, Utah; the File Number of that application is captioned above. According to 
Under Section 1.106(f) of the Commission's Rules, and under Section 405 of the 
Communications Act of 1934, as amended, a petition for reconsideration must be filed 
with the Commission within 30 days following the date of public notice of such action, as 
that date is defined in Section 1.4(b) of the Commission's Rules. Under Section 1.4(b)(4) 
of the Commission's Rules, where, as here, the full text of an action document is not 
"released" by the Commission by making the full text available to the press and the 
public in the Commission's Office of Public Affairs and by having the "release date" 
appearing on the face of the document, as specified in Section 1.4(b)(2) of the 
Commission's Rules, the date of "public notice", within the meaning of Section 1.4(b) of 
the Commission's Rules is deemed to occur on the date that a descriptive document 
entitled "Public Notice" describing the action in question is released by the Commission. 
In this case, the Letter Ruling was not "released" by the Commission by making the full 
text available to the press and to the public in the Commission's Office of Public Affairs, 
nor did any "release date" appear on the face of the Letter Ruling. However, by Public 
Notice (FCC Report No. 44097) released October 15,1997, the Commission gave public 
notice that, on "October 6, 1997", the Commission, by its Mass Media Bureau, had 
granted the above-captioned application of Channel Twenty Television Company and had 
dismissed the above-captioned competing applications (including Hokeiko's above-
captioned application). Hence, under Sections 1.106(f) and 1.4(b)(4) of the 
Commission's Rules, the date by which Hokeiko's instant Petition For Reconsideration is 
required to be filed with the Commission if Friday, November 14, 1997 — i.e., the 
thirtieth day following the date of the Commission's aforementioned Public Notice of 
October 15, 1997. Accordingly, Hokeiko's submission of its instant Petition For 
Reconsideration to the Commission on November 12, 1997 is timely under Section 
1.106(f) of the Commission's Rules. 
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Commission records, on January 9, 1995, KM Communications, Inc. ("KM") tendered for filing 
with the Commission its above-captioned application for a construction permit fora new UHF 
television station on Channel 20 in Salt Lake City, Utah. Thus, the respective applications of 
Hokeiko, of CTTC and of KM for Channel 20 in Salt Lake City were mutually exclusive with 
one another since the Commission could not grant one of the applications without automatically 
denying the other two applications, since mutually destructive electrical interference would 
necessarily result if multiple parties were authorized by the Commission to operate broadcast 
stations simultaneously on Channel 20 in Salt Lake City, Utah, and, accordingly, the above-
captioned applications of Hokeiko, of CTTC, and of KM ere required to be resolved by the 
Commission in a consolidated position before any of the applications could have been granted, in 
the absence of any reversal settlement of the Salt Lake City, Channel 20 proceeding. See 
Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC, 326 U.S. 327 (1945). 
On December 14, 1995, Hokeiko and CTTC sought to resolve their above-captioned 
competing applications by entering into a Settlement Agreement dated December 14, 1995. A 
Settlement Agreement was entered into by CTTC and KM, as well. On December 14, 1995, a 
Joint Request for Approval of Settlement Agreement was tendered for filing with the 
Commission on behalf of KM, Hokeiko, CTTC and Front Range Broadcasting Company 
("FRBC") (which was an applicant for a construction permit for a new UHF television station on 
Channel 24 in Ogden, Utah), in which those parties requested Commission approval of certain 
Settlement Agreements annexed to that Joint Request. The Settlement Agreements contemplated 
dismissal of the respective applications of KM, Hokeiko and FRBC and the grant of CTTC's 
above-captioned application for Channel 20 in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
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On the morning of October 8, 1997 - i.e., approximately 22 months following the date of 
submission of the Joint Request to the Commission - undersigned counsel for Hokeiko spoke 
with the Commission's staff and informed her (i.e., Ms. Salina Ayers) that Hokeiko would that 
day be terminating its participation in the Settlement Agreement by sending notice under that 
agreement to the affected parties and by filing with the Commission on behalf of Hokeiko its 
Withdrawal of Joint Request For Approval of Settlement Agreement (hereinafter "Notice of 
Withdrawal"). Annexed hereto as Exhibit 2 is the Declaration of Irving Gastfreund, in which it 
is established (at ^6) that, during the October 8, 1997 conversation, Ms. Ayers advised him that, 
as of that date, the joint request was still under consideration and required additional work by the 
Mass Media Bureau's Television Branch and that all action would require normal approval by 
the Chief of the Television Branch. Id. at 3. In addition, the annexed Declaration establishes 
that, on October 8, 1997, Hokeiko, by its counsel, sent notice to CTTC of termination of the 
Settlement Agreement, effective upon ten days written notice pursuant to Paragraph 13 of the 
Settlement Agreement. Id. at f7. Furthermore, on October 8,1997, Hokeiko filed with the 
Commission its Notice of Withdrawal. In that pleading, Hokeiko advised the Commission that it 
was terminating the Settlement Agreement with CTTC and would renew pursuit of its competing 
application for Channel 20. 
In addition, to assure that the staff of the Television Branch of the ?Video Services 
Division of the Commission's Mass Media Bureau had a copy of Hokeiko's Notice of 
Withdrawal, a copy of that notice was sent by Mr. Gastfreund, on behalf of Hokeiko, via 
facsimile on October 8, 1997, to: (1) Clay C. Pendarvis, Esq., Chief of the Television Branch of 
the Video Services Division of the Commission's Mass Media Bureau; (2) Mary M. Fitzgerald, 
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Esq., Supervisory Attorney, Television Branch, Mass Media Bureau; and (3) Selina Ayers of the 
staff of the Television Branch of the Video Services Division of the Mass Media Bureau. See 
Exhibit 2, infra, J^IO. Mr. Gastfreund also telephoned Ms. Fitzgerald to ensure receipt of his 
facsimile transmittal. Id- He also telephoned Ms. Fitzgerald on October 9, 1997, to confirm 
receipt of a different facsimile transmittal. Although receipt was confirmed, at no time during 
his conversations with Ms. Ayers or Ms. Fitzgerald on October 8-9, 1997, was he informed that 
the Commission's Television Branch in the Video Services Division of the Mass Media Bureau 
had acted on the Joint Request or had granted CTTC's aforementioned application or had 
dismissed Hokeiko's application. See Exhibit 1, infra, at % 10. 
Several days after October 8, 1997, Hokeiko's undersigned counsel received by mail at 
his office a copy of a Letter Ruling addressed to, inter alia. Hokeiko and others; that letter was 
signed by Clay C. Pendarvis as Chief of the Television Branch of the Video Services Division of 
the Commission's Mass Media Bureau; that Letter Ruling (FCC Ref. No. 1800E1-SA) bore a 
date stamp of October 6, 1997. That Letter Ruling approved the Settlement Agreement; 
dismissed Hokeiko's application and dismissed KM's competing application and granted the 
above-captioned application of CTTC for a construction permit. The envelope in which the letter 
ruling arrived in my office via the U.S. Postal Service mail bears a postage meter stamp dated 
October 10, 1997. See Exhibit 2, \l1. Additionally, the Television Branch of the Mass Media 
Bureau issued to CTTC a construction permit (Permit File No. BPCT-950320KK) bearing a date 
of October 6, 1997, and an expiration date of October 6,1999. That construction permit 
evidences the grant by the Commission of the CTTC application. 
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Based upon information conveyed to Hokeiko's counsel by Ms. Ayers during their brief 
meeting on October 8, 1997, and based on the fact that neither Ms. Ayers nor Ms. Fitzgerald 
advised him on October 8 or 9, 1997, that the Commission had acted on the Joint Request and 
had dismissed Hokeiko's application and had granted CTTC's application prior to or on October 
8, 1997, and, indeed, given the indication to Mr. Gastfreund from Ms. Ayers on October 8, 1997, 
that additional work remained for the Television Branch on the approval process for the 
Settlement Agreement, Mr. Gastfreund clearly understood that the Commission's staff had not 
taken any action to approve the Joint Request on or before October 8, 1997. See Exhibit 2 at 
1f 12. Hence undersigned counsel was shocked and surprised to receive the aforementioned Letter 
Ruling which bore the October 6, 1997, stamped date (which was not typewritten), which was 
purportedly two days prior to the date (i.e., October 8,19979) on which Hokeiko's Notice of 
Withdrawal was filed and upon which it was faxed to the Commission's staff. Exhibit 2, ^fl2. 
This was particularly surprising because the Letter Ruling (dated October 6,1997) had, as its 
designated FCC reference number, the number "1800E1-SA". Id. The "SA" of the number, in 
the experience of Hokeiko's counsel with Commission, which began in 1973, are the initials of 
the Commission's staff member assigned to draft the ruling and submit it to the Chief of the 
Branch for approval — here, that staff FCC member was Selina Ayers, whose initials are "SA". 
Hence, in the experience of Hokeiko's counsel, Ms. Ayers would be expected to know on 
October 8, 1997, whether the Television Branch had taken action by that date on the Joint 
Request or whether additional work on the matter was required. See Exhibit 2 at f 12. What Ms. 
Ayers stated to Hokeiko's counsel on October 8, 1997, was that the latter proposition was true. 
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In light of the foregoing and in light of the experience of Hokeiko's FCC counsel in 
Commission procedure and practice, it was counsel's conclusion that the Letter Ruling bearing 
the October 6, 1997 date stamp was actually issued by the Television Branch of the 
Commission's Mass Media Bureau after October 8,1 997, and not on October 6, 1997, 
presumably through inadvertence. See Exhibit 2 at f 13. 
Furthermore, the attention of the Commission is respectfully invited to the provisions of 
Section LI 03 of the Commission's Rules. Under Section 1.103(a) of the Rules, unless otherwise 
specified by law or by Commission Rule, the effective date of any Commission action is the date 
of "public notice" of such action, as the latter date is defined in Section 1.4(b) of the 
Commission's Rules. As noted in footnote 1, above, the date of such "public notice" in this case 
was October 15, 1997. Hence, the filing by Hokeiko with the Commission on October 8, 1997 of 
Hokeiko's Notice of Withdrawal occurred a full week prior to the October 15, 1997 effective 
date of the Letter Ruling. This was clearly more than sufficient time for the Commission and its 
staff to be on notice as to the fact that Hokeiko had taken action to effectuate its withdrawal from 
the Settlement Agreement 
In light of all the foregoing, it is clear that the Commission's Letter Ruling was 
improvidently issued, in that it improperly and improvidently dismissed Hokeiko's above-
captioned application and improvidently and improperly granted CTTC's above-captioned 
application. The Commission clearly should have continued to maintain the viability of 
Hokeiko's application and should have continued to process it. Consequently, the grant by the 
Commission of CTTC's application, in light of the pendency of Hokeiko's application, was 
improper, under Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC, 326 U.S. 327 (1945). 
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In addition, the grant of CTTC's above-captioned application, as established by the Letter 
Ruling and upon aforementioned Commission construction permit evidencing the grant of 
CTTC's application, were improper and improvidently issued, in that CTTC lacks the requisite 
character qualifications to be a Commission permittee or licensee. 
In this regard, it should be noted that CTTC has instituted a lawsuit against Hokeiko in 
the Third Judicial Court of Salt Lake County in the State of Utah. Channel Twenty Television 
Company, L.L.C. v. Garry A. Spire d/b/a Hokeiko Broadcasting Company. Civil Action No. 
970907787CN (Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, November 1997). Annexed 
hereto as Exhibit 3 is a photocopy of CTTC's complaint in that proceeding. As will be noted 
therein, CTTC is seeking a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction and a 
permanent injunction designed to prevent Hokeiko from filing its instant Petition For 
Reconsideration with the Commission and designed specifically to prevent impede and obstruct 
Hokeiko from bringing to the Commission's attention the facts which Hokeiko presently seeks to 
bring to the Commission's attention. 
These facts raise substantial and material questions of fact as to whether CTTC possesses 
the requisite character qualifications to be and remain a Commission permittee and, significantly, 
a licensee. It is a basic tenet of broadcast communications law that construction permits may be 
awarded only to applicants who are fully qualified. See Kannapolis Television Co.. A Joint 
Venture. 1 FCC Red 1037, 1039 (1986); Professional Radio. Inc.. FCC Red , FCC 86-
362 (released August 18, 1986). Thus, in Kannapolis Television Co.. A Joint Venture, the full 
Commission firmly rejected a settlement agreement which contemplated the grant of an 
applicant's application where the applicant was found unqualified on character grounds to be a 
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licensee. The Commission has also held that, where a party files pleadings or takes other 
obstructive actions intended to delay or harass its opponents, such actions undermine the 
Commission's processes and adversely reflect on the party's character to be a Commission 
licensee. See Policy Regarding Character Qualifications in Broadcast Licensing. 102 FCC 2d 
1179, 1211 (1986); see also, Viacom International. Inc.. 2 FCC Red 3259, 3260 (1987); Radio 
Carrollton. 69 FCC 2d 1139, 1150-51 (1978), clarified. 69 FCC 2d 424 (1978), a£Pd sub nom.. 
Faulkner Radio. Inc v. FCC. F.2d , No. 79-1749 (D.C. Or. October 15, 1980), cert. 
denied, 450 U.S. 1041 (1981). Furthermore, the Review Board has held that it would be 
improper for an applicant to deliberately withhold from the Commission information pertinent to 
another applicant's qualifications to be a licensee, since such conduct constitutes an abuse of the 
Commission's processes. Home Service Broadcasting Corp.. 24 FCC 2d 192, 196 (Rev. Bd. 
1970). 
As shown above, in this case, CTTC has gone so far as to file a complaint with the state 
courts in Utah seeking not only monetary damages against Hokeiko for alleging breach of the 
Settlement Agreement (contention which is denied by Hokeiko), but, in addition, CTTC's 
Complaint has requested the state court judge in the State of Utah to issue a temporary 
restraining order (and such other injunctive relief as may be appropriate) to specifically prevent 
Hokeiko from bringing to the Commission's attention facts which would bear on the propriety of 
the Letter Ruling in this case and on the propriety of granting a construction permit to CTTC.2 
2
 However, the Commission's attention is respectfully invited to the fact that, subse-
quently, on this date, the Trial Court Judge in the State of Utah denied CTTC's request 
for a temporary restraining order, and, based on such conduct, Hokeiko was enabled to 
file its instant Petition For Reconsideration with the Commission on this date, once 
counsel for Hokeiko learned of the Judge's refusal to issue a temporary restraining order. 
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Clearly, CTTC must have been aware, through its communications counsel, that the deadline for 
the filing of the instant Petition For Reconsideration was by the close of business on Friday, 
November 14, 1997, and that, under Section 1.106 of the Commission's Rules and Section 405 
of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, any failure by Hokeiko, for whatever reason, 
to file its instant Petition For Reconsideration with the Commission by the close of business on 
Friday, November 14, 1997, would have to be regarded by the Commission as fatal delay in 
timeliness of filing, thereby justifying dismissal of any such filing at a later time. A prompt 
filing by Hokeiko was thus jurisdictional. Here, CTTC's specific conduct to seek a restraining 
order and to seek injunctive relief designed specifically to prevent Hokeiko from bringing facts 
to the attention of the Commission constitute an abuse of process which is far more serious than 
mere threats. Even threats are inappropriate and contrary to Commission policy in Letter from 
Timothy D. Hutchinson to John W. Connor (October 18, 1991), attaching Letter from Alan Y., 
Naftalin to Timothy D. Hutchinson (October 18, 1991). The Commission itself has recognized 
that abuse of process occurs even when an improper threat is made to invoke the Commission's 
process unless another party accedes to some demands. See, e.g.. Gulf Coast Communications. 
Inc., 81 FCC 2d 499, 513 (Rev. Bd. 1981), recon. denied, 88 FCC 2d 1033 (Rev. Bd. 1981), 
review denied. FCC 82-168 (April 16, 1982). In short, CTTC has used improper means in an 
effort to literally prevent Hokeiko from bringing facts and arguments to the Commission's 
attention which might be adverse to CTTC and to its ability to become and remain the permittee 
(and, presumably, the licensee) of a new UHF television station on Channel 20 in Salt Lake City, 
Utah. Clearly, the Commission should not sanction such conduct, which constitutes manifest 
abuse of the Commission's processes by CTTC, 
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In light of all the foregoing, it is clear that CTTC lacks the character qualifications to be 
and to remain a Commission permittee or licensee. Accordingly, even if it were to be assumed, 
arguendo, that the dismissal of Hokeiko's above-captioned application were proper (an 
assumption which has been borne herein to be completely unwarranted), nonetheless, in light of 
the facts described above, the grant of CTTC's application by the Commission was arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion and wholly improper, based upon the clear lack of character 
fitness by CTTC to hold the Commission authorization for Channel 20 in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
It should be noted that CTTC's Complaint in the state court action in Utah was apparently 
filed with the Third Judicial Court of Salt Lake County on November 3, 1997. See, Exhibit 2 
hereto. Moreover, on November 5, 1997, CTTC filed with that court its Motion For Temporary 
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction; in addition, on November 7, 1997, CTTC filed 
with the Utah court its Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support of its Motion For 
Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. For the convenience of the 
Commission, copies of CTTC's Motion of November 5, 1997 and of the CTTC Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities of November 7, 1997, are annexed hereto as Exhibits 3 and 4, 
respectively. It should also be noted that CTTC's Motion For Temporary Restraining Order was 
denied on November 12, 1997, by Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki. 
In short, the facts pertaining to the filing by CTTC of its request for a restraining order 
and injunctive relief to prevent Hokeiko from bringing facts to the Commission's attention — 
facts upon which Hokeiko is now relying — clearly relate to events which have occurred or 
circumstances which have changed since the last opportunity to present such matters (i.e., prior 
to the date of the Letter Ruling and prior to the date of the October 6, 1997 issuance of a 
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construction permit to CTTC. As shown above, the filing of the state court litigation by CTTC 
has just occurred, and it took place several weeks following the date of the Letter Ruling and the 
date of the aforementioned construction permit. Consequently, these facts are cognizable by the 
Commission, pursuant to Section 1.106(c)(1) of the Commission's Rules, since these facts fall 
within the category set forth in Section L106(b)(2)(i) of the Commission's Rules. 
III. Conclusion 
In light of all the foregoing, the Letter Ruling of the Video Service Division and the 
issuance of the Video Service Division of its construction permit to CTTC for Channel 20 in Salt 
Lake City, Utah, were arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, contrary to law and 
established practice, and wholly improvident and improper. For the reasons set forth above, 
dismissal of Hokeiko's above-captioned application by the Video Services Division was 
improper; Hokeiko's application must continue to be processed and should not have been 
dismissed. Moreover, for the reasons set forth above, grant of Hokeiko's application pursuant to 
the Settlement Agreement was improper, since there was no longer a universal settlement, in 
light of Hokeiko's withdrawal. Moreover, grant by the Commission of CTTC's captioned 
application was improper in any event, and arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of discretion, in 
light of CTTC's manifest abuse of process in its clear efforts to impede, obstruct and prevent 
Hokeiko from bringing advance facts to the attention of the Commission, Plainly, CTTC lacks 
the requisite character qualifications to be and remain a Commission permittee and licensee. In 
light of all the foregoing, the Mass Media Bureau (Video Service Division) should expeditiously 
reconsider and vacate its Letter Ruling and should expeditiously rescind its grant of the CTTC 
construction permit for Channel 20 in Salt Lake City, Utah, the Mass Media Bureau should also 
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expeditiously reinstate Hokeiko's above-captioned application to pending status and thereupon 
continue to process Hokeiko's application in the ordinary course. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GARRY A. SPIRE d/b/a 
HOKEIKO BROADCASTING COMPANY 
Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler,. LLP 
901 15th Street, N.W., Suite 1100 
Washington, D.C. 20005 
(202) 682-3526 
Its Attorneys 
November 12, 1997 
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THE COURT: Counsel, I've had the opportunity, of 
course, to read over your memorandums and I can assure you 
that I've read over and over these paragraphs which you've 
been referring to here. And I fully understand that the 
Court does not have the right to rewrite the contract of 
the parties and that's what I hope I'm not doing here, 
although probably part of you are going to feel like maybe 
I am doing that. The Court does try to look at this as to 
what is reasonable and what make sense as far as all the 
wordings of the paragraphs, all the wording in the 
paragraphs concerned give some meaning to it. 
Now, I asked counsel a question that you can't 
have something to fail to approve unless you have something 
to approve. And this starts out in kind of a backward or a 
negative sense, to say you fail to approve, the only way 
you fail to approve something is you must have something to 
approve. And if you have to fail to approve it within 12 
months, then it follows that you must approve it within 12 
months. 
Now, I broke down this paragraph in this way, I 
say that (A) if the commissioner or his delegates for any 
reason, one, fails to approve this settlement agreement, to 
1 
grant the application and to dismiss the competing 
applications within 12 months after submission to joint 
petitioner requested such approval, or, two, if approved, 
such actions do not become final orders, then (B) either 
party may terminate this settlement agreement upon ten day 
written notice to the applicant. 
Now, that still leaves a question in mind, it 
does in my mind, but it could leave a question as to where 
does the 12 months apply. Now, if I read that again, read 
it this way, and, of course, you can put it two different 
ways; (A) the commission or his delegates for any reason, 
one, fail to approve this settlement agreement to grant the 
application and dismiss competing applications within 12 
months of the submission of the joint petition who 
requested such approval, or, two, if approved within 12 
months after submission such actions do not become final 
orders and (B) then either party may object. Now, I think 
that gives full meaning to all of the paragraphs. 
Now, counsel for the plaintiff has raised the 
issue in that it doesn't give full meaning because it could 
not become final-- at least 45 days elapsed. Apparently 
that's the argument or that's the rules of the commission, 
I assume. 
I asked counsel for the defendants where does the 
12 months apply, to the approval or to the becoming final 
2 
orders? He says becoming final orders. Of course, I 
reread that and rewrote it and, number two, if approved, 
such actions do not become final orders within 12 months 
after submission, then (B) either party may terminate this 
settlement agreement. 
Now, that is the interpretation of this Court. I 
think it is the most reasonable to be placed upon this. 
However, the Court is even of the opinion that if it does 
not become final within the 12 month period, that the 
application must be approved within the 12 month period. 
So either way the Court interprets the paragraph 13 as the 
application must either be denied or approved within 12 
months and/or -- and, of course, based on that I would have 
to find in favor of the defendant. 
But then I go on, and/or the question is then 
must become final order within 12 months. I'm of the 
opinion that's where it implies also, although I don't 
think I need to find that to rule on this issue because I 
do still think that they could still have objected to the 
application and, of course, terminate it within the ten day 
period. 
Now, based on that, I have to find in favor of 
the defendant and against the plaintiff. Now, I'm also of 
the opinion that paragraph called 13--no, paragraph 3, 
paragraph 3, the conditions met in paragraph 3 have not 
3 
been met. They are conditions precedent as far as the 
application becoming final and the agreement all being 
adhered to, although I do agree with the plaintiffs that I 
do think that the benefit of the conditions precedent, most 
of them run to the benefit of the plaintiff. And if it was 
just on that alone then I may be looking at making a 
different decision. 
I don't think the question of the impeding, or 
paragraph 4 comes into play under my ruling. I don't think 
the question of estoppel comes into play under my ruling. 
I would ask the defendants to prepare an order 
and the necessary findings of facts to support my position. 
Any questions? 
MR. ARRINGTON: Thank you. 
THE COURT: If there are no questions the Court 
will be in recess. 
MR. RAMPTON: I'm sorry, your Honor. You 
indicate, I'd like a little clarification on whether the 
ruling, you say that the breach, the prior breach does not 
come into play in your ruling. Is the Court ruling that 
there are no prior breaches? 
THE COURT: Oh, yes, I think there have been prior 
breaches. But to rule the way, to reach my ruling, I did 
not have to get into paragraph 3 as far as the breaches are 
concerned. Yes, I think they have been breached although I 
4 
1 am of the opinion that most of them are under the benefit 
2 of the plaintiff and if I looked close to it, maybe some of 
3 those might have been breached because they are to the 
4 benefit of the plaintiff and he can set them aside, if you 
5 understand what I'm saying. 
6 MR. RAMPTON: Is that saying there wasn't any 
7 evidence that there was impeding though? 
8 THE COURT: Oh, on the impediment? I'm saying 
9 that, in the impediment I didn't even get into that. No, I 
10 don't think there's sufficient evidence here in the 
11 contract for impediment under paragraph 4 
12 J (End of requested proceedings 
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